“SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACTS OF ROHINGYA REFUGEES ON BANGLADESH”

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Migration Policy Center

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"SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACTS OF ROHINGYA REFUGEES ON BANGLADESH"

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“Socio-Political Impacts Of Rohingya Refugees On Bangladesh”

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Overview

With the alarming increase in the number of worldwide refugees, the number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has also increased as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated a number of 923,000 Rohingya have come to Bangladesh during 1978-2017 escaping the persecution of Myanmar military. Human rights groups alleged it an indiscriminate and systematic campaign against Rohingya civilian villages in the Arakan³ state and the United Nations’ top human rights official- Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein called it ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ (The New York Times, 11 September 2017; UNHCR, 10 November 2017) leaving big socio-political challenges for Bangladesh with its already overpopulation of 160 million people. It would not be exaggerated to say that there is limited study on socio-political impact of Rohingya influx on Bangladesh despite their big influx into Bangladesh. The only significant report - *Rohingya refugee crisis: impact on Bangladeshi

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² The Rohingya is a Muslim ethnic group out of 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar but not recognized officially by the Myanmar government.
³ Present name of Arakan is Rakhine
politics by Iffat Idris (2017), published after beginning of the latest Rohingya influx into Bangladesh in August 2017, illustrates political impact of Rohingya refugees on Bangladesh. Apart from that, a study of The Creation and Consequences of International Refugees: Politics, Military and Geography by W. McColl’s (1993) reveals that international refugees have social, political and military impacts regardless of their places and times which left a pathway to frame my understanding on my specific context based on a global experience.

This report applies above mentioned insights to a critical examination on the impact of the Rohingya refugees on their host community. In doing so, this report uses primary and secondary data sources through a historicist approach. Application of secondary data sources and scrutinizes of them suggest that Rohingya refugees cause a social and political degradation at different levels in Bangladesh such as environment degradation, militancy, social unrest, intra-state conflict and uneasiness in Bangladesh’ relationship with Myanmar and India. However, researchers think that a state-sponsored persecution with different styles at different times by Myanmar military had forced Rohingyas to enter into Bangladesh which normally requires a brief discussion on the way how Rohingya Muslims of Arakan became refugees in Bangladesh.
1. Historical Background

Independence of Myanmar from the British in 1948 and following arbitrary treatment to Muslims inhabitants like denial of return of thousands of the Muslims who fled the 1942 massacre in Arakan, confiscation of their properties and imposing restriction upon their movement prompted a group of Muslims to organize ‘Jihadi’ movement against Burmese administration (Yunus, 1994: 66-67). It followed action of Burmese administration against the Jihadis causing a big massacre to Arakanese Muslims with deaths of hundreds of Islamic intellectuals and general Muslims triggering more than 50,000 of them to flee to the then East-Pakistan (Ibid).

However, factionalism among ‘Mujahids’ in 1951 weakened their foothold in Arakan creating an opportunity for Burmese administration to apply a tactic to isolate the Mujahids from general Arakanese Rohingya Muslims (Nemoto, 1991:4; Yunus, 1994: 67). General Rohingya Muslims got recognition as a Burmese ethnic group having all facilities like other nationals by the then U Nu government in 1954 that easily convinced the former to take the side with the government and stop supporting the Rohingya rebellion (Ibid).

Besides, a commitment for establishing a Muslim national area in northern Arakan with the power of autonomy further embarrassed the Mujahids whether continuation of Jihad and finally forced them to leave the Jihad in 1961(Yunus, 1994: 67) which tangibly brought normalcy in their life.


Moreover, Muslims of Arakan were expelled from high ranking offices except some posts of clerks and teachers; all student organizations and other social-

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4 Jihad is an Arabic word means revolt or struggle for something.
5 The word used for meaning who do Jihad or struggle to implement or get something.
6 Burma was the ancient name of Myanmar.
7 Though Burmese way of socialism impacted overall Burma’s people but small entrepreneurs were spared of while Arakanese Muslims having entrepreneur of most of the big businesses in Arakan lost everything and none (small or big ) of them was spared of.
political-cultural organizations were banned during 1962-1965 through marking them ‘kalas’; and Arakanese Buddhists were instigated by Ne Win himself to take action against Arakanese Muslims (Yunus, 1994: 74).

In fact, to understand the reality, this study requires remembering the history of the British colonial rule in Burma when couples of censuses marked the Muslims of Arakan as ‘Indian Muslims’, ‘Indian’, ‘Mohamedan’ or ‘Chittagongian’ (Yegar, 1972: 115-122). These are the strong evidences staged by now-a-days Myanmar’s authority for Rohingya Muslims’ not being nationals of Arakan (Ibid). It also keeps chances for the Myanmar authority to make plot easily against the Rohingya which (will be explained later) can be clearly understood by the condition applied by the 1982 citizenship law of Myanmar for Rohingya’s being nationals of Myanmar.

Besides, Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942 and Rohingya Muslim’s loyalty to the British fragmented the long established peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Buddhists in Arakan which followed by (as noted before) communal clashes between them with a heavy damage of lives and properties and internal displacement of both communities (Lee, 2013 cited in Ibrahim, 2016: 21; Yunus, 1994: 64).

In addition, under a 20 years long Rohingya elimination plan of military government (1962-88), Operation Nagamin was conducted in 1977 by Burmese immigration and military authority through asserting it a national venture to register citizens and identify foreigners ahead of an upcoming national census (Elahi, 1987: 231; Yunus, 1994: 77). This census marked Rohingyas as illegal (Human Rights Watch, 2000); and eased the way of carrying out a widespread brutality, rape and murder of Rohingyas by Burmese army (Smith, 1991: 241) that caused a number of 200,000 Rohingyas influx to Bangladesh in 1978 as refugees (HRW, 2000).

Most importantly, 1982 citizenship law of Myanmar cancelled the citizenship right of Rohingya as they could not fill up the condition for being citizens (Steinberg, 2013: 73). This law granted citizenship to ‘those who were Burman or a member of

Arakan, a lot of Bengalees went to Arakan as seasonal labors but majority of them came back during 1942 massacre in Arakan

10 Rohingyas were forced to go to Northern Arakan from the south and Buddhists were forced to southern Arakan from North.
indigenous ethnic/linguistic groups or those who could prove they were descendants of residents who had lived in what was Burma in 1823’ (Steinberg, 2013:73; Burmese Rohingya Organization UK, 2014). As discussed before, censuses carried out during British rule in Burma did not mention the word Rohingya, which is why Myanmar government and Buddhist intellectuals tended to pay an attempt to prove the Rohingya as ‘outsiders’ in contrast to a strong historical evidence of Rohingya’s more than 200 years long rule in Arakan (Yunus,1994:38-43).

However, the mass democratic movement of 1988 pressurized the junta government to arrange a national election in 1990 but ultimately they did not recognize election results giving birth to intense dissatisfaction in the mind of mass people regardless of races (Yunus, 1994:80-81).

Through reading the nature of Military junta’s above mentioned policy actions and aftermath experiences in Arakan, it would not be exaggeration to say that in an attempt to divert the attention of Myanmar masses, Myanmar military suddenly attacked a Bangladeshi border outpost and killed some soldiers (Ahmed, 2012 in Al Jazeera). Even they started to massacre Arakanese Muslims through the ‘Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation’ in July 1991 using the tensions11 created by the military junta themselves (Ibid). It again forced more than 200,000 Rohingyas to take shelter into Bangladesh as refugees (Ibid).

A decade later, the incidence of rape and murder of a Buddhist woman in late May 2012 and suspicion12 of three Rohingya men’s connection with it, confronted Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Arakan that followed violent attacks on each other (Ibrahim, 2016: 97). The violence escalated after killing of ten Muslims on 3 June 2012 by a Buddhist attack on Bus carrying Muslims (Ibid). This also caused damages for Buddhists (Ibid).

Again, on 9th October 2016, another incidence of attack on police reportedly by the Rohingya militants left nine police officers dead which followed by what rights groups allege an indiscriminate and systematic campaign against civilian Rohingya villagers in Arakan by the Myanmar’s military force using gunships to fire (Huffington Post, 14th December 2016). But this time no Rohingya could enter into Bangladesh due to Bangladesh’s decision of not to accept them and

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11 Both countries assembled their soldiers along borders but no war happened

12 Rohingyas always deny of their connection and mark it as a plot of conspiracy against them.
consequent highest alertness by Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) along border (Amnesty International, 24 November, 2016).

Recently, since late August 2017, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas crossed into Bangladesh to escape another military crackdown which the United Nations’ top human rights official- Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein defined as ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ (The New York Times, September 11, 2017). According to UNHCR, before the starting of the last influx of Rohingya refugees on 25th August 2017, an estimated 307,500 Rohingya were already existed in Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh) which has now reached to 923,000 with last influx of 615,000 Rohingya (UNHCR operational update on Bangladesh, 10 November 2017). Among them, 73% are living in new spontaneous settlements, 13% in makeshift settlements, 9% are living in host community locations and 5% in the formal refugee camps (Needs and Population Monitoring report, December 2017).

Importantly, out of the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, only 36,583 are registered (UNHCR Family Counting Factsheet, 14 December 2017) who are now living in the two formal camps while the remaining 829,421 are unregistered living scattered in Cox’s Bazar (Ibid). Certainly this is a matter of concern with the potentials of creating big consequences for the host community in Bangladesh. In fact, as noted before, this big number of Rohingya refugees is creating different socio-political impacts on Bangladesh like other refugees in the world. The discussion that follows tries to put ink on socio-political impacts of Rohingya refugees on Bangladesh.

2. Socio-political Impacts of Rohingya Refugees on Bangladesh

2.1. Local Environment Degradation

UNHCR’s Environmental Guidelines (1996), cited in Martin (2005:332), argues that refugees may impact host communities’ environment by the six categories: natural resource degradation; irreversible impacts on natural resources; impacts on health; impacts on social conditions; social impacts on local populations and economic impacts. Martin (2005:332) also comments that once

\[\text{\textsuperscript{13} Cox’s Bazar is the south-eastern district of Bangladesh along Arakan of Myanmar where}\]

majority of the Rohingya refugees are living now.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{14} Kutupalong and Nayapara refugee camps}\]
refugees are settled, demand of resource may increase dramatically and to satisfy that the following happen: forests starts to be converted to agricultural land, collection of firewood from forests, extraction of surface and ground waters, fishing and hunting and producing extra wastages threatening the human health.

My understanding is similar to above mentioned literature that Rohingya refugees impact Bangladesh heavily as every year water level of Ukhia (an upozilla of Cox’s Bazar district) is being dropped making the situation intense with already existing drop by 3-5 feet every year before the Rohingya influx into Cox’s Bazar (Humanitarian Response Plan, September 2017-February 2018). Because of the intense water demand of big number of Rohingyas, the level of water could reach where can be easily understood with a grave concern for both locals and Rohingya population.

In addition, wood is the main source of fuel for the Rohingya refugee families in Cox’s Bazar which is being collected mainly from the protected forest reserves of Cox’s Bazar (FAO and IOM. June 2017) damaging local environment seriously and contributing to deforestation and depletion of water resources badly (Humanitarian Response Plan, September 2017-February 2018). All existing settlements and new proposed camps for Rohingyas being in the area of Forestry Department Reserve of Bangladesh government (Ibid), its social forestry is being destroyed through installing shelters and gathering wood fuel by an expanding population which is leaving a far-reaching tension among local government authorities, local communities and the displaced Rohingya population (FAO, IOM, June 2017).

Furthermore, Bangladesh’s years long experience of soil erosion, sea level rise, natural disasters (flood, cyclone etc.) and landslides in Cox’s Bazar area made the issue formidable for both-locals and Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar (The Washington Post, 12th February 2018). In addition, smoke from firewood burning and regular up-down of thousands of jeeps, trucks and cars for the purposes of transporting a lot of aid workers, visitors and goods for camps are polluting the air of Ukhia and Teknaf heavily that is contributing to climate change with its already heavy existence in Bangladesh (Ibid).

2.2. Trafficking as a State and Non-state Security Threat for Bangladesh

For the last few decades, trafficking as a global phenomenon and interstate border
issue, is recruiting international perpetrators and achieving multimillion dollar business (Berdal and Serrano, 2002; Interpol 2011). The US Department of State (2010) estimates that there are more than 12 million victims of human trafficking globally among existing varieties\(^\text{15}\) of trafficking in the world.

Apart from the above, human trafficking, as a form of organized crime, creates security threats for states (Afdan, 2012: 172); reflects the changing landscape of security where individual actors along with militaries are seemed to play important role to imperil the security (Buzan, Ole and Wilde, 1998; Kaldor, 1999; Keohane 2002 cited in Afdan, 2012: 173). It has also the capability of committing devastating damage in favor of state actors (Salehyhan, 2008, 12).

Finding a similarity with above mentioned literature, this study comments that there has been established a collaborated human trafficking network mixed with local Bangladeshis, new arrived Rohingyas and also those who are staying in refugee camps for a long time (Modern diplomacy, 5 December 2017) that contains a high potential of non-state security threat for Bangladesh.

In fact, unemployment and scarce work opportunity for Rohingyas keep them under vulnerability of being victim to any persuasion or offer of better life and by turn entangling them with trafficking. Intensity of the trafficking can be easily understood by the remark of IOM counter trafficking specialist Emmy Nurmiña Sjarijono:

“Trafficking was already a problem in Cox’s Bazar before the most recent influx of refugees from August 2017. With so many more people now at risk, it is vitally important to work together with the police and other and other authorities to prevent an increase in trafficking victims over the coming month” (IOM press release, 16th January 2018).

In the same speech she also argued that …

“Rohingya children, women and men are targeted by traffickers who seek to exploit them in various situations including the sex industry, as unpaid domestic help, and in other forms of bonded labor. There is no single solution to ending trafficking and it is vital that aid

\(^{15}\) There are different types of trafficking in the world, such as-drug, arms, human etc. are important.
agencies and the authorities work together to build skills and share information about this extremely serious issue” (Ibid).

Thinking from a deeper position, Shelly (1999) argues that traffickers also undermine governance and territorial integrity creating social instability which ultimately hampers state security (Shelly, 1999). Bangladesh for having direct air, sea and road communications with almost all drug producing countries in the region, Cox’s Bazar’s 16 Naf River is used as the parade route by international drug traffickers and arms smugglers especially by Burmese drug traffickers (The Daily Star, 06 September 2003). In addition, a report by Association for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Manas) reveals that Over 500 ‘Yaba’17 smugglers have entered Bangladesh from Myanmar since August 25, 2017 by posing them as Rohingya refugees and that Yaba is being smuggled through 43 points of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border (The daily Dhaka Tribune, 05 December 2017).

Importantly, recently alarming number of Yaba tablet have been seized by the security agencies of Bangladesh and Rohingya’s involvement with most cases feared Cox’s bazar district administration (Ibid). Moreover, Interpol says that about 5% of the world’s drug trafficking is channeled through Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazar) which is alarming for national security of Bangladesh (Ibid). This concern is reflected in the recently significant increase in trafficking of Methamphetamine or ‘Yaba’ from Myanmar through Cox’s Bazar and on into the regions (Rakhine Advisory Commission report) bringing potentials for thinking it as a state security threat.

2.3.Prostitution

An interview on prostitutes in Austria and Nederland reveals that there is a possibility to work as a prostitute being influenced by friends, family or nearest who were already working as sex workers or prostitutes (Wagennaar, Amesberger and Altink, 2017). Similarly, Thomson Reuters Foundation’s interview in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh reveals about 500 Rohingya prostitutes are living in Kutupalong and many of them are living there for long days and persuading other women and girls who have recently affected in Myanmar and taken shelter in refugee camps of cox’s Bazar. As this

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16 Cox’s Bazar is the South- eastern district of Bangladesh having ‘Naf’ river as the border with Myanmar

17 Yaba is a famous drug tablet in south and south east-Asia that is very popular among young societies
flourishing sex trade is offering cash money, new arrivals are being attracted in it due to their desperation to get food and water in overcrowded camps (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 24 October 201).

In search for the root causes of prostitution in refugee camps, Ferris (2007) argues that humanitarian aids are normally being food and therefore existing insufficiency in satisfying other necessities prompt refugee women and girls to prostitution. The case is not exception for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who are being provided mostly food and the like. There is a very scarcity of providing sanitation, medicine, education or entertainment materials. Most importantly, women need some cash money to satisfy their some of needs what they never disclose to aid agencies or during their pregnancy they may have wishes to buy different foods out of their regular and same food provided by the agencies. All these insufficiencies contribute to women and girls to be involved with prostitution in a hope to get cash money.

However, completely apart from the above argument, a study conducted by UNHCR and Save the Children UK in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone reveals that humanitarian workers, teachers of camp schools and medical staffs are also involved with sexual exploitation of refugee female children, girls and women (UNHCR and Save the Children UK, 2002, cited in Ferris, 2007).

Moreover, sometimes, parents pressurize their female children to sexual exploitation to secure their needs and essentials (Ferris, 2007). This study, after explaining different national and international news regarding prostitution or female abusing, suggests that like other refugees in the globe, young Rohingya women are being forced to do jobs which they never agreed to do (UN News 14th November 2017) because a number of adolescent girls in cox’s Bazar and Chittagong were forced into prostitution though they were promised to work as domestic helpers (Ibid).

2.4. Social Unrest

Chulasiriwongs (2001:342), in accordance with the experience of refugees in Thailand, argues that if poverty exists in host community, naturally they have extra demand of better life; however, when they see their nearby refugees being provided better facilities compared to them, they start to feel jealousy to refugees. Similarly, Cox’s Bazar, being one of the poor populated cities in Bangladesh, demands extra economic provision in different fields for its development and a special treatment from Bangladesh government to Rohingya
refugees bears a big potential to create social animosity between two ethnic groups-local Bengali and Rohingya. Besides, Cox’s Bazar being the coastal town attracts tourists and creates job markets for the locals but the presence of a lot of foreign aid workers brought price hike in the market from where poor locals and day laborer buy their essentials. It created a grave dissatisfaction in their minds what ultimately keeps potentials of animosity against the refugees (The Washington Post, 12 February 2018). Local day laborers also have lost their works as Rohingyas become agreed to work in a lower wage (Ibid). At the same time it lessened their wages those were working different local jobs like farming land and the like (Ibid). Obviously this is creating social unrest in Cox’s Bazar and in turn in Bangladesh.

2.5. Security Threats from Militant Groups

Jacobsen (1996: 672) says that Refugee influx potentially threatens the host countries’ national security in three dimensions: firstly, state’s military capability to protect itself from external intervention; secondly, the regime’s capacity to protect itself from internal conflict and disorder; thirdly, state’s ability to maintain balance between its population and resource disbursement (basic needs). A repeated attack by South African military on refugee camps and houses during 1980s justifying it as a self-defensive action against those refugees involved in subversive activities against south-Africa; attack on refugee camps in Thailand and Pakistan due to guerilla existence there from Combodia and Afganistan; attack on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in 1983 (Ibid) keep room for the potentials of same incidence in Bangladesh.

This report along with above mentioned literature argues though movement of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is restricted to certain areas and not allowed to go beyond; previous experiences from the already existent Rohingyas in Bangladesh strengthened the high potentials for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to be recruited in different extremist groups. For instance, in January 1998,a group of armed refugees, thought to be from the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO)\(^{18}\) seized the Nayapara refugee camp and gave birth clashes with Burmese security forces near the Bangladesh border that caused three Rohingya’s death as well as 64 refugees’ jail sentences due to clash with police of Bangladesh (Ullah, 2011: 154).

\(^{18}\) RSO is a militant organization of Rohingya
Lintner (2009, cited in Ullah, 2011) claims that Rohingya camps (for refugees who fled to Bangladesh in earlier years) were being run by Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI19). The possibility of militancy is also echoed by Rahman (2010: 235): ‘The Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazaar district are fertile grounds for recruitment by Islamic militants. With little love for Myanmar, and alienated from Bangladesh, the stateless Rohingyas are vulnerable and desperate, and likely become militant in an effort to uphold their interests”.

Similarly, a risk assessment conducted by US-AID in 2012 warned that the plight of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh – denied citizenship rights and facing persecution – could make them tended to be recruited in extremist groups (USAID, 2012, cited in Idris, 2017).

In explaining the consequences of refugees’ existence in host communities, Jacobsen (1996: 673) comments that refugees contain potentials of attachment with local community politics, possibility of aggravating discontent among local communities by straining existing resources-land, job etc. and consequent agitation among locals against the host country’s government. It prompts the government of host country to follow the strategy of separating refugees from mainstream locals for the sake of easy monitoring of the camps (Ibid). Rohingya refugees’ connection with different extremist Islamic groups in Bangladesh (Saw.2011:7-42; Murshid, 2012: 5-7) keeps a big potentials for causing the same as also has been mentioned in the above literature. Moreover, through mentioning the experience of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and Palestinian refugee’s taking side of the invader, Jacobsen (1996: 672) also argues that a long-term stay in refugee camps far away from the main locality may create intense resentment and sense of deprivation in the minds of refugees towards host community.

Thinking the case of Rohingya from the same viewpoint as discussed above, this study argues that due to the decade’s long deprivation from the education rights, Rohingyas have no formal and institutional knowledge about the contemporary world. Those who are supposed to be educated have only knowledge of Quran and Hadith. Some of them have good knowledge in Arabic. But lack of explanation power with

19 A forbidden Islamic extremist group in Bangladesh
contemporary knowledge, there are many possibilities for them to be converted easily as ‘Jihadist’ through arousing their feelings of deprivation. It is also very difficult for Bangladesh to provide them education. Many international organizations are working for Rohingyas to provide education; but their stay for a long time or permanently will make the task challenging. Religious extremist groups will then come to fill the vacuum creating potentials to recruit to militant group.

2.6. Impact upon Bangladesh-Myanmar and Bangladesh-India Relationship

Host countries’ treatment to refugees depends on multidimensional facts: a) nature of the sending countries such as United States’ welcome reception of Cuban asylum seekers who left their unfriendly communist country but not receiving asylum seekers from Haiti due to their country of origin being not communist despite their eligibility for refugee status (Jacebson, 1996; Loescher, 1987; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989); b) intention of receiving and sending country such as sending country wants to destabilize the receiving country or force the receiving country to recognize the receiving country or to deter receiving country’s interference into sending country whereas receiving country often follow refugee policy to embarrass the unfriendly sending country or to save the friendly sending country from embarrassment what is exemplified by Ethiopian refugees sheltered in Somalia who were expected by the Somalia’s government to use in fighting against the Ethiopian army (Jacebson:665).

In reality, Bangladesh’s behavior towards Rohingyas and its overall foreign policy to Myanmar keep no chance to raise question about their ill intention against Myanmar anyway rather Bangladesh’s policy of status-quo with India and China because of their big playing role in Myanmar. However, it creates a big resentment in term of the bilateral relationship between Myanmar-Bangladesh and Bangladesh-India.

In a quite different argument with the example of Liberian refugee arrival into Sierra Leon in 1990, Leach (1992) says that social receptiveness of the local communities defines whether refugees will be welcomed or not in spite of their creating strains on basic needs of local people.

The literature works to the same extent for Rohingya refugee arrival into Bangladesh as local people compromised the heavy risk of their livelihoods and in turn created a favorable situation for Bangladesh
government to take a pro-humanitarian stance to Rohingya refugees (though) having negative impacts on bilateral relationship. Decade(s) long Rohingya persecution by Burmese military in Rakhine and their periodic influxes into Bangladesh has long overshadowed the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Though a tripartite talks between the government of Bangladesh and Myanmar and the United nations successfully made the majority of initial influx of Rohingyas repatriate to Myanmar, most of the later influxes stayed in Bangladesh (Rahaman, 2010) because of the fear of being persecuted again if they return to Myanmar.

In fact, disputes over maritime boundaries, arms trafficking and cross-border movement of armed insurgents are some already existed historic sources of conflicts between the two countries (Parnini et al, 2013) and have been increased by current massive outflow of Rohingyas into Bangladesh. It is creating extreme tension for the foreseeable future of Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relationship.

In addition, a study of *Thailand's Relations with the New ASEAN Members: Solving Problems and Creating Images* by Chulasiriwongs (2001:340) reveals Thailand’s hesitating humanitarian policy to existing refugees in its territory. Some corrupted Thai officials and politicians’ connection in helping refugees to flee the camps in the search for employment and also about Myanmar government’s accusation of possible abuses of the refugees against the national security interest of Myanmar, gave birth chances to think the case of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh in a similar way (Ibid). Furthermore, like the case between Myanmar and Thailand (Ibid:340-41), Myanmar’s suspicious looking over Bangladesh’s acceptance of bulk of Rohingyas despite the latter’s not being a signatory to *United Nations Convention on Refugees 1951*; accusation from international non-government actors about Bangladesh’s mismanagement of Rohingya refugees; Myanmar’s unwillingness about repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar and aftermath created mistrust made an unequal and untrusted relationship between two neighbors.

Moreover, W. McColl (1993:176) again argues that Afghan Mujahid’s attachment with refugees in Pakistan is a military threat to Afghanistan and bears a potential of Afghan military raid inside Pakistan and in turn confrontation between two neighbors.
Similarly, with a little difference, RSO\textsuperscript{20} and ARSA’s\textsuperscript{21} possible connection with different extremist groups of Pakistan and their appearances in Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong hill tract area of Bangladesh may create a burning issue in Bangladesh-India bilateral relationship (IPAC Report, 8 May 2017:2-5). In such case, India can intervene into Bangladesh (Ibid) due to Pakistan’s clear anti-Indian stance. It ultimately will hamper Bangladesh-India’s peaceful co-existence.

Recently, during the vote on the issue of Rohingya persecution in the general assembly of United Nations, India abstained itself from voting against Myanmar which strengthened more anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh (The Independent, 7\textsuperscript{th} December 2017). In fact, India’s fear about Rohingya refugees’ possible penetration to India and combatting insurgents (who use Myanmar as a base) in India’s north-eastern states prompt New Delhi to maintain close cooperation with Myanmar and support directly or keep them silent over Myanmar’s atrocities upon Rohingyas (Hasnain, 2017; Alam, 2017). It is creating a clear hostile situation between Bangladesh and India (Ibid).

Besides, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an official visit to Myanmar in September 2017 and expressed concern about ‘extremist violence’ in Rakhine and solidarity with the government of Myanmar to its fight against terrorism (Lintner, 2017; Mitra, 2017). But he did not utter any word about Rohingya plight that not only fueled anti-Indian sentiment but also kept room for Islamic rhetoric inside Bangladesh (Ibid). It certainly bears possibility of intense consequences of bitter relationship between the two neighbors (Ibid).

**Conclusion**

This report concludes with the argument that in spite of being a developing country, Bangladesh has given shelter to a big number of Rohingya refugees in its territory. Despite many international organizations’ full ranges of working for the betterment of the Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh, multidimensional socio-political problems are being created there like environment degradation, human trafficking, prostitution, recruitment of Rohingyas into militancy and social unrest keeping traditional and non-traditional security threats for Bangladesh directly or

\textsuperscript{20} Rohingya Solidarity Organization (a militant organization of Rohingya)

\textsuperscript{21} Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (another militant organization of Rohingya)
indirectly. Nevertheless, it is not so surprising because scarce income generation opportunities within camp areas simply make the Rohingyas prone to be preys to human traffickers. Thus they are being trafficked to mostly middle-eastern countries while women are being used as sex workers in most cases as they have no option then. So simply it is not very easy to tackle this problem within a short time.

This report suggests that a long time and coordinated effort can tackle the above mentioned problems. Every human has multidimensional demands that never can be fulfilled in a place where they have taken refuge temporarily. Giving citizenship rights back to Rohingya Muslims can be the first step to empower them which will open all other doors to bring a permanent solution for them. Even all resources of all international aid agencies may not fulfill all demands of this huge number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and truly that is not possible at all. Every one of the Rohingyas was owner of a piece of land in Arakan. Only giving back this land with a citizenship right in the Myanmar constitution can fulfill their demands and make a hope to live safely. A human living within a demarcated area rather may prefer death to life. There are no recreation or sports opportunities for the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. As a result, when one of them get any offer from someone to go outside of their restricted life, easily accept it and become victim in many cases. International bodies like United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), ASEAN and others have to play more active role to pressurize Myanmar government to obey international laws regarding human rights and stop persecution of Rohingyas in Arakan. Otherwise, Bangladesh as a host of bulk of Rohingya refugees will suffer socio-politically in the long run with its already existed multidimensional intra-state problems.
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